Author Hernán Alejandro Olano García, in his essay “Theory of Conventionality Control,” explains this concept as follows:
The interrelationship between international human rights courts and national courts is what has come to be known as conventionality control, which emerged from the contributions of Inter-American jurisprudence and “involves assessing the acts of domestic authorities in light of international human rights law, as expressed in treaties or conventions.”¹
In this regard, when a country has ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, its judges are obliged to ensure compliance with its provisions. In doing so, they must be guided not only by the text of the Convention itself, but also by the interpretation given to it by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Consequently, the domestic norms applied by judges must be consistent both with the text of the Convention and with the Court’s interpretative criteria.
The Inter-American Court has also stated that, in each case, national courts should not limit themselves solely to examining the constitutionality of their decisions, but must also conduct a review of their conventionality.²
In this respect, in the case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Judgment of November 29, 2006, paragraph 173,³ the following was stated:
The Court is aware that domestic judges and courts are subject to the rule of law and are therefore obliged to apply the provisions in force within the legal system. However, when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as part of the State apparatus, are also bound by it. This obliges them to ensure that the effects of the provisions of the Convention are not undermined by the application of laws contrary to its object and purpose, which lack legal effect from the outset. In other words, the Judiciary must exercise a form of “conventionality control” between the domestic legal norms applied in specific cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. In carrying out this task, the Judiciary must take into account not only the treaty itself, but also the interpretation given to it by the Inter-American Court, the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.
Ana Magnolia Méndez Cabrera
Ultimately, there is coherence within American doctrine regarding the central elements of conventionality control, which are the following:⁴
a. There exists an obligation on the part of the judiciary to comply with international norms that the State has incorporated into its domestic legal system and which therefore form part of the internal normative framework.
b. This is a hermeneutical exercise aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of conventionally recognized rights and preventing the State from incurring international responsibility.
c. Norms that are contrary to the Convention cannot produce effects within the domestic legal order, since such norms, being incompatible with international obligations, constitute an internationally wrongful act that engages the responsibility of the State.
d. In carrying out this interpretative exercise, judges must take into account the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).
Along these same lines, the content and scope of conventionality control were defined by the Inter-American Court in the case of Almonacid Arellano v. Chile,⁵ in which it specified that:
a) It consists of verifying the compatibility of domestic norms and other internal practices with the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, and other inter-American treaties to which the State is a party;
b) It is an obligation incumbent upon all public authorities within the scope of their respective competencies;
c) For the purpose of determining compatibility with the ACHR, consideration must be given not only to the treaty itself, but also to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court and other inter-American treaties to which the State is a party;
d) It is a form of review that must be carried out ex officio by all public authorities; and
e) Its implementation may involve either the removal of norms that are contrary to the ACHR or their interpretation in conformity with the ACHR, depending on the powers vested in each public authority.
From these five elements or characteristics, attention is directed to how the doctrine of conventionality control should be applied by courts and constitutional tribunals.
In this regard, the Court has stated that judges of the States Parties to the Convention are bound by it, which “obliges them to ensure that the effective effect (effet utile) of the Convention is not diminished or nullified by the application of laws contrary to its provisions, object, and purpose. In other words, judicial bodies must exercise not only a review of constitutionality, but also a review of conventionality ex officio between domestic norms and the American Convention, evidently within the framework of their respective competencies and the corresponding procedural regulations.”⁶
The Court has expressed, in several cases,⁷ that the interpretation of constitutions and domestic legislation must be aligned with the principles established in its jurisprudence. This same idea was reaffirmed in the case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, in which it was stated that “in this task, judges and bodies linked to the administration of justice must take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation given to it by the Inter-American Court, the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.”⁸
In this sense, the Dominican Constitutional Court has acknowledged that it must exercise adequate conventionality control, in accordance with Articles 3 and 7 of Law No. 137-11, the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court,⁹ a position it has reiterated in its decisions.
At this point, it should be emphasized that Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Dominican Constitution establishes that treaties, pacts, and conventions relating to human rights, signed and ratified by the Dominican State, have constitutional hierarchy and are of direct and immediate application by the courts and other organs of the State.
However, with regard to the application of the Court’s interpretation of the Convention, it must be noted that the Dominican Constitutional Court, through Judgment TC/0256/14, declared unconstitutional the Instrument of Acceptance of the Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights signed by the President of the Dominican Republic on February nineteenth (19), nineteen ninety-nine (1999). Through this decision, the Constitutional Court sought to distance itself from the interpretation of the Convention carried out by the Inter-American Court. As a result, the Constitutional Court has ceased to regularly apply the Court’s interpretations in its decisions, as it had done prior to that ruling.
With respect to constitutional review in the Dominican Republic, two forms of control continue to coexist: diffuse control and concentrated control. Diffuse control is exercised by the courts of the Republic and is established in Article 188 of the Constitution. It constitutes a means of defense aimed at declaring the unconstitutionality of any law, decree, regulation, or act that affects a party within a specific judicial proceeding. When this mechanism is invoked, the court is obliged to address the constitutional objection as a preliminary issue prior to the examination of the remaining matters.
perfecto. aquí tienes un párrafo más largo, cohesionado y desarrollado, manteniendo el tono académico y el contenido jurídico, pero con mejor fluidez y profundidad:
En el ordenamiento jurídico dominicano coexisten dos formas de control de la constitucionalidad: el control difuso y el control concentrado. El primero recae sobre todos los jueces del país, quienes tienen el deber de ejercerlo incluso de oficio en los casos que les son sometidos, garantizando así la supremacía constitucional en cada proceso judicial concreto. Por su parte, el control concentrado de la constitucionalidad es ejercido exclusivamente por el Tribunal Constitucional, órgano competente para conocer de las acciones directas de inconstitucionalidad contra leyes, decretos, reglamentos, resoluciones y ordenanzas que infrinjan, por acción u omisión, normas sustantivas de la Constitución. En la sentencia TC/0224/17, el Tribunal Constitucional dominicano precisó los elementos que caracterizan este tipo de control, destacando su naturaleza concentrada, al ser una atribución exclusiva de dicho tribunal; su carácter interactivo, en tanto faculta a toda persona con un interés legítimamente protegido a impugnar la constitucionalidad de una norma; y su efecto decisivo, ya que una vez conocida y fallada una acción directa de inconstitucionalidad, el texto objeto del control no puede ser nuevamente impugnado ante el mismo órgano, en virtud de la cosa juzgada constitucional. Asimismo, el análisis del sistema dominicano de control constitucional revela que, además de estos mecanismos previstos en la Constitución y debidamente desarrollados por la legislación, resulta imprescindible ejercer el control de convencionalidad respecto de los tratados internacionales ratificados por el Estado, los cuales forman parte del derecho interno por mandato constitucional. En este sentido, el Tribunal Constitucional no solo ejerce un verdadero control de constitucionalidad por la vía directa, sino que también asume un rol activo en el control de convencionalidad, tal como se evidencia en diversas decisiones. Un ejemplo relevante de ello es la declaración de inconstitucionalidad del documento de aceptación de la competencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos por parte de la República Dominicana, decisión estrechamente vinculada a los casos relativos a nacionales haitianos sometidos ante dicho órgano internacional, en los que se ha comprometido la responsabilidad del Estado dominicano en materia de nacionalidad y presuntos actos de discriminación. En conclusión, todo lo expuesto permite afirmar que el sistema dominicano cuenta con un marco claro y definido de control de la constitucionalidad y de la convencionalidad, cuyo ejercicio ha sido desarrollado y delimitado por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional.
BIBLIOGRAFÍA
- Olano García, Hernán Alejandro. Teoría del control de convencionalidad. Estudios Constitucionales, Santiago, vol. 14, núm. 1, pp. 61-94, julio de 2016. Disponible en: https://scielo.conicyt.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52002016000100003&lng=es&nrm=iso. Accedido el 13 de noviembre de 2018. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-52002016000100003.
- Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Caso Boyce y otros vs. Barbados. Sentencia de 20 de noviembre de 2007. Cuadernillo de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, núm. 7, p. 4.
- Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Cuadernillo de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, núm. 7, p. 44.
- Nash Rojas, Claudio. Control de convencionalidad. Precisiones conceptuales y desafíos a la luz de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (2013), citado por Olano García, Hernán Alejandro, Teoría del control de convencionalidad, Estudios Constitucionales, Santiago, vol. 14, núm. 1, 2016.
- Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Caso Almonacid Arellano y otros vs. Chile. Excepciones preliminares, fondo, reparaciones y costas. Sentencia de 26 de septiembre de 2006.
- Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Cuadernillo de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, núm. 6, p. 4.
- Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Casos Radilla Pacheco vs. México; Fernández Ortega y otros vs. México; Rosendo Cantú y otra vs. México.
- Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Cuadernillo de Jurisprudencia, op. cit., p. 7.
- Tribunal Constitucional de la República Dominicana. Sentencia TC/0190/13.
- República Dominicana. Ley núm. 137-11, Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucional y de los Procedimientos Constitucionales, artículos 51 y 52.
